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The Need for Situational Awareness
Assessment Tools to Improve Police 
Decision-Making Competence (Part One)
Hyeyoung Lim, PhD, Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas, 
Criminal Justice Center, Sam Houston State University
David Webb, PhD, Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas, 
Criminal Justice Center, Sam Houston State University
Introduction
For many professions, instruments of one sort or another are used almost routinely 
to assess the level of competence of professionals in decision-making relative to 
their particular occupations. Aircraft pilots, doctors, engineers, and the like are 
no strangers to such testing. Members of police departments, overall, have little 
exposure to such forms of assessment, even though they are required from time 
to time to make critical decisions regarding public safety. At the Law Enforcement 
Management Institute of Texas (LEMIT), part of the Criminal Justice Center 
housed at Sam Houston State University, a piece of research has commenced to 
assess police officers’ levels of situational awareness, with the ultimate intention 
of designing training that enhances decision-making competence. This three-part 
series addresses the issues involved. The first paper examines the use of applied 
cognitive psychology in a law enforcement decision-making context; reviews 
the concept of human error, utilizing a few case studies; examines the concept of 
situation awareness; and finally addresses the differences between intuition and 
logical thinking. The second paper describes how simulation-oriented training 
helps law enforcement officers make better decisions, and the final paper describes 
how situation awareness assessment tools and simulation training work together.
The Use of Applied Cognitive Psychology in a Law Enforcement 
Decision-Making Context
Cognitive psychology is the study about “the mental processes involved in acquiring 
and making use of knowledge and experience gained from our senses. The main 
processes involved in cognition are perception, learning, memory storage, retrieval 
and thinking, all of which are terms that are used in everyday speech and therefore 
already familiar to most people” (Esgate et al., 2005, p. 2). Recently, people became 
more interested in applying cognitive psychology to real-life situations, asking 
questions like “Just how do cognitive processes influence individuals’ behavior and 
performance?” This gave birth to the term identified as applied cognitive psychology. 
Since it has focused on measuring human factors, behavior, and performance, 
the research community’s concern had concentrated on working memory. Since 
the term was first used for linking the mind to a computer in the 1960s, now it 
usually refers to “the system responsible for the temporary storage and concurrent 
processing of information” (p. 90). Since working memory plays an important role 
in comprehension, learning, reasoning, problem solving, and reading, it has been 
applied in various research areas such as aviation, improving teaching methods, 
artificial intelligence, the medical field, human-computer interaction, and so on. 
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In 1974, Baddeley and Hitch introduced the concept of working memory, and 
it was developed by Baddeley (1986). The working memory “is characterized 
by the assumption that short-term storage of information must be considered 
as part of a more complex system involved in the execution of a specific task. 
The information is stored in the working memory as long as necessary, and the 
structure need not be defined only in terms of the dichotomy between short- and 
long-term information storage. On the contrary, this system has the ability to store 
and process information simultaneously” (Cornoldi & Vecchi, 2003, p. 6). Baddeley 
and Hitch’s (1974) working memory model was originally composed of three 
main components: (1) phonological loop, (2) visuo-spatial sketchpad, and (3) central 
executive, and in 2000, Baddeley added the fourth component, episodic buffer, which 
integrates phonological, visual, spatial, and auditory information (Baddeley, 1986; 
Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). 
Working memory capacity is the most important determinant of individual differences 
in the performance of information-processing tasks, thus, cognitive skills (Baddeley, 
1986; Baddeley & Andrade, 2000; Esgate et al., 2005; Turner & Engle, 1989). A number 
of studies have demonstrated “the relationship between working memory capacity 
and individual performance in reading comprehension, speech comprehension, 
spelling, spatial navigation, learning vocabulary, note-taking, writing, reasoning, 
and complex learning” (Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999, as cited in Esgate et al., 2005, 
p. 91). Esgate et al. (2005) asserted that “performance in these and related tasks can 
be predicted by individual differences in the working memory capacities of the 
participants” (p. 91). Here is our point. Although applied cognitive psychologists 
focus on finding individual differences in the working memory capacity, this study’s 
main point is the opposite of it. In other words, the purpose of this study is to develop, 
improve, and maximize law enforcement officers’ performance in decision-making 
processes by utilizing individual differences in cognitive skills. 
Human Error
When some disasters or tragic catastrophes occur, people refer to them as 
predictable because they believe the disasters are manmade catastrophes, thus, they 
happened by human error. What is the distinction between errors and mistakes? 
In psychology, “an error is an appropriate action that has gone awry somewhere 
in its execution. A mistake, on the other hand, is a completely inappropriate 
action based upon, for example, faulty understanding of a situation, or faulty 
inferences and judgments” (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982, cited in Esgate 
et al., 2005, p. 121). However, in general, the terms error and mistake are commonly 
interchangeable and are defined as an act or thought which is considered to be 
incorrect, wrong, or faulty. As mentioned before, most human error research has 
been mainly conducted in aviation, medicine, engineering, industrial areas, and so 
on, but not in the law enforcement field, although errors made by law enforcement 
officers can bring not only more fatal dangers but also big monetary damages. 
The following cases are good examples of human errors made by police officers’ 
misjudgment. 
For Diallo’s case, Case 1, the City of New York became the subject of a $61,000,000 
lawsuit claimed by his mother and stepfather in April 2000, and the City had to 
pay a $3,000,000 settlement to them in 2004. As a result of his death, the Street 
Crime Unit in the City of New York was disbanded, and his story was filmed by 
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Case 1. Seven Seconds in the Bronx
The 1100 block of Wheeler Avenue in the Soundview neighborhood of the South 
Bronx is a narrow street of modest two-story houses and apartments. At one 
end is the bustle of Westchester Avenue, the neighborhood’s main commercial 
strip, and from there, the block runs about two hundred yards, flanked by trees 
and twin rows of parked cars. The buildings were built in the early part of the 
last century. Many have an ornate facade of red brick, with four- or five-step 
stoops leading to the front door. It is a poor and working-class neighborhood, 
and in the late 1990s, the drug trade in the area, particularly on Westchester 
Avenue and one street over on Elder Avenue, was brisk. Soundview is just the 
kind of place where you would go if you were an immigrant in New York City 
who was looking to live somewhere cheap and close to a subway, which is why 
Amadou Diallo made his way to Wheeler Avenue. 
Diallo was from Guinea. In 1999, he was twenty-two and working as a peddler 
in lower Manhattan, selling videotapes and socks and gloves from the sidewalk 
along Fourteenth Street. 
He was short and unassuming, about five foot six and 150 pounds, and he 
lived at 1157 Wheeler, on the second floor of one of the street’s narrow 
apartment houses. On the night of February 3, 1999, Diallo returned home to 
his apartment just before midnight, talked to his roommates, and then went 
downstairs and stood at the top of the steps to his building, taking in the night. 
A few minutes later, a group of plainclothes police officers turned slowly onto 
Wheeler Avenue in an unmarked Ford Taurus. There were four of them—all 
white, all wearing jeans and sweatshirts and baseball caps and bulletproof 
vests, and all carrying police-issue 9-millimeter semiautomatic handguns. 
They were part of what is called the Street Crime Unit, a special division of 
the New York Police Department, dedicated to patrolling crime “hot spots” in 
the city’s poorest neighborhoods. Driving the Taurus was Ken Boss. He was 
twenty-seven. Next to him was Sean Carroll, thirty-five, and in the backseat 
were Edward McMellon, twenty-six, and Richard Murphy, twenty-six. 
It was Carroll who spotted Diallo first. “Hold up, hold up,” he said to the others 
in the car.  “What’s that guy doing there?” Carroll claimed later that he had had 
two thoughts. One, that Diallo might be the lookout for a “push-in” robber—
that is, a burglar who pretends to be a visitor and pushes his way into people’s 
apartments. The other was that Diallo fit the description of a serial rapist who 
had been active in the neighborhood about a year earlier. “He was just standing 
there,” Carroll recalled. “He was just standing on the stoop, looking up and 
down the block, peeking his head out and then putting his head back against 
the wall. Within seconds, he does the same thing, looks down, looks right. And it 
appeared that he stepped backwards into the vestibule as we were approaching, 
like he didn’t want to be seen. And then we passed by, and I am looking at him, 
and I’m trying to figure out what’s going on. What’s this guy up to?” 
director Veronica Keitt in 2007 (see the website www.365daysofmarchingmovie.
com). Case 2, the Bell’s case, was filed by his fiancée against the officers involved 
in his death and against the New York Police Department (NYPD) in July 2007.
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Boss stopped the car and backed up until the Taurus was right in front of 
1157 Wheeler. Diallo was still there, which Carroll would later say “amazed” 
him. “I’m like, all right, definitely something is going on here.” Carroll and 
McMellon got out of the car. “Police,” McMellon called out, holding up his 
badge. “Can we have a word?”
Diallo didn’t answer. Later, it emerged that Diallo had a stutter, so he may 
well have tried to say something but simply couldn’t. What’s more, his English 
wasn’t perfect, and it was rumored as well that someone he knew had recently 
been robbed by a group of armed men, so he must have been terrified: here he 
was, outside in a bad neighborhood after midnight with two very large men in 
baseball caps, their chests inflated by their bulletproof vests, striding toward 
him. Diallo paused and then ran into the vestibule. Carroll and McMellon gave 
chase. Diallo reached the inside door and grabbed the doorknob with his left 
hand while, as the officers would later testify, turning his body sideways and 
“digging” into his pocket with his other hand. “Show me your hands!” Carroll 
called out. McMellon was yelling, too: “Get your hands out of your pockets. 
Don’t make me fucking kill you!” But Diallo was growing more and more 
agitated, and Carroll was starting to get nervous, too, because it seemed to him 
that the reason Diallo was turning his body sideways was that he wanted to 
hide whatever he was doing with his right hand. 
“We were probably at the top steps of the vestibule, trying to get to him before 
he got through that door,” Carroll remembered. “The individual turned, looked 
at us. His hand was on—still on the doorknob. And he starts removing a black 
object from his right side. And as he pulled the object, all I could see was a 
top—it looked like the slide of a black gun. My prior experience and training, 
my prior arrests, dictated to me that this person was pulling a gun.” 
Carroll yelled out, “Gun! He’s got a gun!” 
Diallo didn’t stop. He continued pulling on something in his pocket, and now 
he began to raise the black object in the direction of the officers. Carroll opened 
fire. McMellon instinctively jumped backward off the step and landed on his 
backside, firing as he flew through the air. As his bullets ricocheted around the 
vestibule, Carroll assumed that they came from Diallo’s gun, and when he saw 
McMellon flying backward, he assumed that McMellon had been shot by Diallo, 
so he kept shooting, aiming, as police are taught to do, for “center mass.” There 
were pieces of cement and splinters of wood flying in every direction, and the air 
was electric with the flash of gun muzzles and the sparks from the bullets. 
Boss and Murphy were now out of the car as well, running toward the building. I 
saw Ed McMellon,” Boss would later testify, when the four officers were brought 
to trial on charges of first-degree manslaughter and second-degree murder. 
“He was on the left side of the vestibule and just came flying off that step all the 
way down. And at the same time, Sean Carroll is on the right-hand side, and he is 
coming down the stairs. It was frantic. He was running down the stairs, and it was 
just—it was intense. He was just doing whatever he could to retreat off those stairs. 
And Ed was on the ground. Shots are still going off. I’m running. I’m moving. And 
Ed was shot. That’s all I could see. Ed was firing his weapon. Sean was firing his 
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weapon into the vestibule. . . . And then I see Mr. Diallo. He is in the rear of the 
vestibule, in the back, towards the back wall, where that inner door is. He is a 
little bit off to the side of that door and he is crouched. He is crouched and he has 
his hand out and I see a gun. And I said, ‘My God, I’m going to die.’ I fired my 
weapon. I fired it as I was pushing myself backward and then I jumped off to the 
left. I was out of the line of fire. . . . His knees were bent. His back was straight up. 
And what it looked like was somebody trying to make a smaller target. It looked 
like a combat stance, the same one that I was taught in the police academy.” 
At that point, the attorney questioning Boss interrupted: “And how was his 
hand?” 
“It was out.” “Straight out?” “Straight out.” 
“And in his hand you saw an object. Is that correct?” “Yeah, I thought I saw a 
gun in his hand. . . . What I seen was an entire weapon. A square weapon in his 
hand. It looked to me at that split second, after all the gunshots around me and 
the gun smoke and Ed McMellon down, that he was holding a gun and that he 
had just shot Ed and that I was next.”
Carroll and McMellon fired sixteen shots each: an entire clip. Boss fired five 
shots. Murphy fired four shots. There was silence. Guns drawn, they climbed 
the stairs and approached Diallo. “I seen his right hand,” Boss said later. “It 
was out from his body. His palm was open. And where there should have been 
a gun, there was a wallet. . . . I said, ‘Where’s the fucking gun?’”
Boss ran up the street toward Westchester Avenue because he had lost track in 
the shouting and the shooting of where they were. Later, when the ambulances 
arrived, he was so distraught, he could not speak. 
Carroll sat down on the steps, next to Diallo’s bullet-ridden body, and started 
to cry.
Source: Gladwell (2005), pp. 189-194
Case 2. 50 Bullets
In the early morning hours of November 25, 2006, Sean Bell, a 23-year-old 
New York City man due to be married later that day, walked out of a Queens 
strip club, climbed into a gray Nissan Altima with two friends who had been 
celebrating with him—and died in a hail of 50 bullets fired by a group of five 
police officers.
The shooting shocked the city and brought back memories of the deaths in other 
high-profile police shootings—in particular, the death of Amadou Diallo, an African 
peddler killed after police fired 41 shots at him in 1999. Both men were black and 
both were unarmed, although in both cases the officers appeared to have believed 
the suspect had a gun. While the death of Mr. Bell did not prompt the same levels 
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Situation Awareness
Like the above-cited cases, uncertainty, doubt, and fear are common emotions that 
are experienced whenever people need to make a decision, but law enforcement 
officers have to make good decisions in their daily working environment and 
particularly in critical incident situations, no matter how much irreducible 
uncertainty, doubt, and fear they have: “Irreducible uncertainty refers to 
uncertainty that cannot be reduced by any activity at the moment action is required” 
(Hammon, 1996, p. 13). Hammon explained that irreducible uncertainty takes two 
main forms: (1) subjective and (2) objective uncertainty. “Subjective uncertainty 
refers to the state of mind of the person making a judgment, regardless of the state 
of the objective system about the judgment is to be made” (p. 14), while objective 
uncertainty can be explained by the opposite condition of subjective uncertainty. 
Crichton and Flin (2002) pointed out that “situation assessment is a key feature of 
most naturalistic decision-making (NDM) models and is considered paramount 
to effective decision making, where the first step in the decision making task is to 
evaluate the characteristics of the event correctly” (p. 209). Endsley (1993) argued 
that “situation awareness is the perception of the elements in the environment 
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and 
the projection of their status in the near future” (p. 157). Moreover, he asserts 
“in most settings effective decision making largely depends on having a good 
understanding of the situation at hand” (Endsley, 1997, p. 269). Thus, situation 
assessment which evaluates the characteristics of the event or situation correctly 
is an essential part in most NDM processes (Crichton & Flin, 2002). Adams, 
Tenney, and Pew (1995) defined situation awareness (SA) as the product of situation 
assessment. The SA is divided into three levels: (1) Level I is perception of critical 
factors in the environment; (2) Level II is understanding those phenomena; and 
(3) Level III is understanding what can happen within and to the system in the 
near future (Bedny & Meister, 1999; Endsley, 1995). Crichton and Flin (2002) 
stated that “situation assessment refers to the acquisition of information, i.e. the 
integration of cues from the environment, being interpreted on the basis of pre-
existing knowledge leading to meaning being given to the cues” (pp. 209-210). A 
person with good situation awareness “will have a greater likelihood of making 
appropriate decisions and performing well in dynamic systems” (Endsley, 1995, p. 
61). Case 3 is a good example of how situation assessment affects officers’ decision-
making to handle critical incidents and was provided by Gary Klein (1986) in his 
book, The Source of Power: How People Make Decisions.
of rage and protest as the Diallo case, it prompted unsettling questions about the 
changes in police procedures adopted in recent years, and about whether black 
men remained unfairly singled out for aggressive police action. 
On March 16, a Queens grand jury voted to indict three detectives in the case, 
charging the two who had fired the bulk of the shots with first-degree and 
second-degree manslaughter, and the third with reckless endangerment.
Source: O’Neil (2007)
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Case 3.The Overpass Rescue
A lieutenant is called out to rescue a woman who either fell or jumped off 
a highway overpass. She is drunk or on drugs and is probably trying to kill 
herself. Instead of falling to her death, she lands on the metal supports of a 
highway sign and is dangling there when the rescue team arrives. 
The lieutenant recognizes the danger of the situation. The woman is 
semiconscious and lying bent over one of the metal struts. At any moment, she 
could fall to her death on the pavement below. If he orders any of his team out 
to help her, they will be endangered because there is no way to get a good brace 
against the struts, so he issues an order not to climb out to secure her. Two of his 
crew ignore his order and climb out anyway. One holds onto her shoulders and 
the other to her legs. A hook-and-ladder truck arrives. The lieutenant doesn’t 
need their help in making the rescue, so he tells them to drive down to the 
highway below and block traffic in case the woman does fall. He does not want 
to chance that the young woman will fall on a moving car. 
Now the question is how to pull the woman to safety. First, the lieutenant 
considers using a rescue harness, the standard way of raising victims. It snaps 
onto a person’s shoulders and thighs. In imagining its use, he realizes that it 
requires the person to be in a sitting position or face up. He thinks about how 
they would shift her to sit up and realizes that she might slide off the support. 
Second, he considers attaching the rescue harness from the back. However, he 
imagines that by lifting the woman, they would create a large pressure on her 
back, almost bending her double. He does not want to risk hurting her. Third, 
the lieutenant considers using a rescue strap—another way to secure victims, 
but making use of a strap rather than a snap-on harness. However, it creates the 
same problems as the rescue harness, requiring that she be sitting up or that it 
be attached from behind. He rejects this, too. 
Now he comes up with a novel idea: using a ladder belt—a strong belt that 
firefighters buckle on over their coats when they climb up ladders to rescue 
people. When they get to the top, they can snap an attachment on the belt to the 
top rung of the ladder. If they lose their footing during the rescue, they are still 
attached to the ladder, so they won’t plunge to their death. 
The lieutenant’s idea is to get a ladder belt, slide it under the woman, buckle it 
from behind (it needs only one buckle), tie a rope to the snap, and lift her up to 
the overpass. He thinks it through again and likes the idea, so he orders one of 
his crew to fetch the ladder belt and rope, and they tie it onto her. 
In the meantime, the hook-and-ladder truck has moved to the highway below the 
overpass, and the truck’s crew members raise the ladder. The firefighter on the 
platform at the top of the ladder is directly under the woman shouting, “I’ve got 
her. I’ve got her.” The lieutenant ignores him and orders his men to lift her up. 
At this time, he makes an unwanted discovery: ladder belts are built for sturdy 
firefighters, to be worn over their coats. This is a slender woman wearing a thin 
sweater. In addition, she is essentially unconscious. When they lift her up, they 
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Intuition Versus Logical Thinking
One of the decision-making strategies which Crichton and Flin (2002) promoted 
is the Recognition-Primed (intuition/gut feeling) Decision-making (RPD) Model. 
Klein (1997a) stated that “the purpose of RPD model is to explain how people 
could generate and adopt a single course of action, without having to consider 
other options and how people could evaluate a course of action without comparing 
it to others . . . [thus] how mental simulation is used to build stories for evaluating 
different interpretations of the situation” (pp. 15-16). 
Buchanan and O’Connell (2006) argued that “gut decisions are made in moments 
of crisis when there is no time to weigh arguments and calculate the probability 
of every outcome. They are made in situations where there is no precedent and 
consequently little evidence. Sometimes, they are made in defiance of the evidence” 
(p. 40). There is a part called an adaptive unconscious in our brain which leaps to 
conclusions without utilizing the thinking process. Gladwell (2005) stated that the 
adaptive unconscious is like “a kind of giant computer that quickly and quietly 
processes a lot of the data we need in order to keep functioning as human beings” 
(p. 11). Moreover, he asserted that “decisions made very quickly can be every bit 
as good as decisions made cautiously and deliberately” (p. 14). On the other hand, 
LeGault (2006) stated that “critical scientific reasoning almost always involves a 
component of intuition, and intuition is almost always informed by experience 
and hard knowledge won by reasoning things out” (p. 12). Additionally, the 
technique by which we make good decisions and produce good work is a nuanced 
and interwoven mental process involving bits of emotion, observation, intuition, 
and critical reasoning. The emotion and intuition are the easy, “automatic” parts, 
and the observation and critical reasoning skills are the more difficult, acquired 
parts. The essential background to all this is a solid base of knowledge (LeGault, 
2006, p. 12).
Overall, both arguments on making good decisions by utilizing an individual’s 
snap judgment or logical thinking process are right. As Endsley and Bostad’s 
(1994) tests with pilots proved, there existed individual differences in the abilities 
to acquire and maintain situation awareness, each individual having different 
realize the problem. As the lieutenant put it, “She slithered through the belt like 
a slippery strand of spaghetti.” 
Fortunately, the hook-and-ladder man is right below her. He catches her and 
makes the rescue. There is a happy ending. Now the lieutenant and his crew 
go back to their station to figure out what had gone wrong. They try the rescue 
harness and find that the lieutenant’s instincts were right: neither is usable. 
Eventually they discover how they should have made the rescue. They should 
have used the rope they had tied to the ladder belt. They could have tied it to 
the woman and lifted her up. With all the technology available to them, they 
had forgotten that you can use a rope to pull someone up. 
Source: Klein, 1998, pp. 18-19
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abilities. Some have higher intuition which makes the probability of the person’s 
snap judgment more correct than others, while others are good at logical reasoning 
or thinking based on their knowledge, factors that LeGault emphasized. However, 
in a case of critical incident situations, people may use both, even though they are 
not able to recognize it consciously. Thus, even though most of those who have 
good situation awareness ability refer to it as their gut feeling or intuition, that 
ability might be based on prior experience and knowledge (Crichton & Flin, 2002; 
Flin, 1996; Klein, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2003; LeGault, 2006).
On the other hand, there are always errors existing in decision-making processes. 
Mostly those errors are referred to as human errors. Lipshitz (1997) defined decision 
error distinguishing it from common human error: “decision errors are deviations 
from some standard decision process that increases the likelihood of bad outcomes” 
(p. 152). He indicated that “decision errors are likely to produce bad outcomes, but 
some bad outcomes are produced by perfectly sound decisions” (p. 152). 
Bad outcomes can be traced to faulty cognitive processes in complex causal chains 
that consist of (1) a bad outcome, (2) an inappropriate action or substandard 
performance of an appropriate action, (3) a fault in one of the elements of the 
decision-making process (situation analysis, action selection, action planning, and 
implementation), (4) a breakdown in the cognitive mechanisms that control action, 
and (5) situational factors such as time stress or a task structure that overload or 
mislead the cognitive system (Rasmussen, 1993, cited in Lipshitz, 1997, p. 152).
Klein (1997a) also indicated some of the limitations of the RPD model such as 
(1) not addressing cognitive processes, (2) not explaining how the pattern matching 
or judgment of typicality occurs, (3) not explaining what happens when people do 
have to compare courses of action, (4) not accounting for the generation of new 
courses of action, and (5) not offering direct prescriptive guidance for training 
and for distinguishing between good and poor decisions, or for identifying 
errors. Despite these limitations, the RPD model has its strengths: (1) it explains 
how people can make decisions without analyzing strengths and weaknesses of 
alternative courses of action; (2) it explains how people can use their experience to 
adopt the first action they consider workable; (3) it shows how expertise can affect 
decision-making; (4) it shows the positive contributions of the availability and 
representativeness heuristic (permitting recognition of situations as typical) and 
the simulation heuristic (for explaining events and evaluating courses of action); 
(5) it spotlights the process of mental simulations; (6) it generates some empirical 
findings; and (7) it has been supported by several replications (Klein, 1997a, p. 16). 
Consequently, whatever it has been called, gut feeling, intuition, or logical 
reasoning, it can be developed and improved through education or training 
(Crichton & Flin, 2002; Flin, 1996; Gladwell, 2005; Klein, 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 
1998b, 2000, 2003; LeGault, 2006).
Our Future Research and Development
Our intention is to build on this wealth of knowledge to actually develop and 
improve the decision-making capabilities of the members of our police community. 
At this time, one of our solutions is the creation and development of a situational 
awareness test software program. We will leverage existing technologies being used 
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in the field of cognitive psychology and apply them in the development of such 
a tool. The next paper will describe how simulation-oriented training helps law 
enforcement officers to make better decisions.
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